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Problem
Generally, theorists who intend to take public 
deliberation seriously tend to claim that citizens 
engaging in deliberation should be sincere about the 
information they have and their true intentions and 
interests
> A number of normative principles of sincerity citizens 
need to conform to when they exchange reasons in 
public discourse have been defended
But they seem inconsistent
Question: Is sincerity a necessary requirement for 
deliberation? Are there any alternatives out there?
Relevance
Theory: sincerity is something that is usually taken for granted about 
deliberation without much conceptual work
Practice: sincerity is a problem for political scientists concerned with 
deliberative democracy > “Sincerity is the deliberative criterion that is 
most poorly empirically investigated because it is also the most difficult 
to grasp […] the existing measurements of sincerity are limited and 
weak. The textual analysis approach [and] the survey analysis and 
interviews […] are problematic” (Bächtiger A., Niemeyer S., Neblo M., 
Steenbergen M., Steiner J. 2010)
Hypothesis: the criterion of sincerity (so far defended) is inconsistent 
and weak
Aims: to unpack the problems concerning sincerity in deliberation and 
attempt to find a better suited alternative
Outline
1) The role of the principle of sincerity in deliberative theories
2) Contra Rawls, Schwartzman, J. Cohen, Gaus
3) Sincerity as a slippery concept
4) Reliability in Deliberation
Preliminary remarks
> No particular theory or conception 
of deliberative democracy
> “Deliberation” = situation in which different 
individuals reason together to take a collective decision
>  No interest in levels of deliberation 
(small-scale, large-scale, citizens, representatives, 
minipublics, ecc)
> It is not a critique of sincerity per se, 
but of sincerity within the specific context of deliberation
Sincerity is a fundamental validity claim for a form of rational communication 
apt to enable individuals to reach shared social and political
 understandings (Habermas 1984; 1966)
Sincerity promotes “free discussion and open debate [that] allow relevant 
information to be distributed,mistaken reasoning to be exposed, and all the 
reasons for and against laws to be debated and 
considered” (Freeman 2000, 383)
Sincerity expresses respect among citizens in the form of 
“equal  membership of all in the sovereign political body” (Cohen 1997
Sincerity fosters civic friendship (Rawls 1997)
Sincerity is an antidote against rhetoric and manipulation (Quong 2011)
Sincerity secures relations of trust among citizens and generate 
shared commitments (Googin 2008)
> Sincerity blocks manipulation and dishonesty
The benefits of sincerity
John Rawls
“It is important that it be clear and established that the proviso is to 
be appropriately satisfied in good faith. Yet the details about how to 
satisfy this proviso must be worked out in practice and cannot 
feasibly be governed by a clear family of rules 
given in advanced” (Rawls 1997, 784)
> It is not clear what the principle of good faith actually prescribes
> The reason why individuals should conform to the principle of 
sincerity is unexplained
As it stands, Rawls's argument is ad hoc
Joshua Cohen
Argument 1: “I stipulated  that the members of the association are 
committed to resolving their differences through deliberation, 
and thus to providing reasons that they sincerely expect to be 
persuasive to others who share that commitment. In short, this 
stipulation rules out the problem” (Cohen 1989)
> Stipulation is not a justification
Argument 2 “[The argument] rests on a claim about the effects of 
deliberation on the motivations of deliberators […] the practice of 
presenting reasons will contribute to the formation of a commitment 
to the deliberative resolution of political questions. Given that 
commitment, the likelihood of a sincere representation of 
preferences and convictions should increase, while the likelihood 
of their strategic misrepresentation declines” (Cohen 1989)
> This is an unsupported empirical claim 
Micah Schwartzman
Principle of Sincere Public Justification (SPJ): A ought to 
advocate proposal p if, and only if, A (i) believes that (R1 → p), and 
(ii) publicly asserts R1 as sufficient to justify p (Schwartzman 2011, 
385)
> It works with a minimal understanding of the concept of sincerity
> SPJ preserves nicely and elegantly the possibility for citizens to 
hold on to their non-public reasons
Conceptual:  SPJ < Principle of Respect
2 Arguments 
Instrumental: Sincerity improves deliberation
Against Schwartzman 1
PR triggers SPJ:
“Those who engage in political advocacy without satisfying the 
requirement violate the duty of civility. They fail to justify their 
political claims to others and so demonstrate a lack of respect for 
the reasonableness of their fellow citizens” (Schwartzman 2011, 
386)
However, SPJ is in tension with reasoning by conjecture, which 
Schwartzman strongly adheres to (2012)
SPJ and RbC cannot be both implied by PR: if RbC is possible, 
then PR does not always prescribe SPJ
> Either Schwartzman drops RbC or provides a more robust and 
sophisticated argument for respect
Against Schwartzman 2
SPJ is justified beacuse of the benefits it provides deliberation 
with
“If everyone expects others to act strategically offering 
insincere reasons, then the epistemic value of deliberation is 
diminished if not all together extinguished” (Schwartzman 
2011, 386)
But, why putting a constraint on reason, admitting only 
sincere public ones to the political domain, should ameliorate 
deliberation?
If what is important of deliberation is to evaluate and verify the 
correctness of political positions and justifications, then all 
reasons should be, in principle, admissible for all reasons 
could help.
Gerald Gaus
From a convergence point of view, a citizen can provide others with 
reasons she does not believe in, as long as these are consistent 
with their systems of beliefs, while holding on to her convictions.
Is it possible to sincerely believing a fellow citizen justified when 
one does not share her set of beliefs and considers it wrong?
> Possible counter-argument: relativism about reasons is true
2 Responses: 
a) relativism is controversial philosophical position
 b) even if relativism was true, it is unrealistic and too demanding to 
require all citizens to believe so
Another Principle of Sincerity?
Is sincerity a good candidate?
2 concepts of sincerity:
(a) Sincerity as authenticity: intrapersonal; concerns 
inner mental states; singleness of mind
(b) Sincerity as truthfulness: interpersonal; sincerity as 
a property of statements; correspondence
Both understandings don't work because they refer to 
indivuals' intentions and inner lives
> Liberalism has always been skeptical of sincerity
Principle of Reliability in Deliberation
PRD < global reliability (Audi 2008)
1) Stability in character / Reflexivity
 
2) Predictability / Reciprocity
3) Correctness / (a) not to defend ideas which are in sharp contrast 
with the general and basic moral claims; (b) not to rely on evidence, 
that one knows it is not true
Principle of deliberative reliability (PDR): A should not advocate 
proposal P if (i) A has no justification for P; (ii) does not discuss her 
reason R in a predictable manner; (iii) knows that P is in opposition 
with general normative understanding and that R is not true, or 
based on false evidence.
PRD vs Cheating
- It neither demands nor prohibits citizens to be sincere 
about their reasons
- It requires citizens only to be honest
- It allows strategic behaviour, but blocks cheating
Cheating: A advocates for proposal P by means of 
achieving Q, but his/her reason R is incompatible with Q
Strategic Behaviour: A advocates for proposal P by 
means of achieving Q, but Q is compatible with his/her 
reason R
